Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that
he proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of
justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of
unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore
of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him?
I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy,
and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your
behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with
holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that
justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that
you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your
behalf, and whether you would agree with me.
He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that
justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be
a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and
let us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is
just.
Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will'
sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I
mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.'
Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness,
for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every
other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like
soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even
the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and
have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar,
and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they
are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one
another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to
be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however
slight, unlike.
And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and
holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your
view.
Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take
another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the
existence of folly?
I do.
And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
That is true, he said.
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be
temperate?
Yes, he said.
And temperance makes them temperate?
Certainly.
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are
not temperate?
I agree, he said.
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
He assented.
And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by
temperance?
He agreed.