Protagoras

Plato · en
I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would
not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to
Callias, and said:--Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in
refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly
think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument,
or distinctly refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and
then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest
of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of
Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were
superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask
and he would answer.

So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in
asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For
I think that Homer was very right in saying that

     'When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),'

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought;
but if a man

     'Sees a thing when he is alone,'

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he
may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would
rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that
no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be
expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there,
but you?--who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many
are this, and yet have not the power of making others good--whereas you
are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others.
Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other
Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas
that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are
the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than
invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and
consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have
my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you
at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not
mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage
and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of
the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a
peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you
replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but
that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were
parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like
each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of
the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another,
and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether