The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions — Plato — John Shaqi
The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always
prone to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which
may serve to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we
cannot reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward
to the inward. The progress of physiological science, without bringing
us nearer to the great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous
notions respecting the relations of body and mind, and in this we have
the advantage of the ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of
immortality is to be discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have
been content to rest their belief in another life on the agreement of
the more enlightened part of mankind, and on the inseparable connection
of such a doctrine with the existence of a God—also in a less degree on
the impossibility of doubting about the continued existence of those whom
we love and reverence in this world. And after all has been said, the
figure, the analogy, the argument, are felt to be only approximations in
different forms to an expression of the common sentiment of the human
heart. That we shall live again is far more certain than that we shall
take any particular form of life.
[Sidenote: _The immortality of the soul._]
7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further
what we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living
being in countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three
years’ old child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to
see the furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space
really exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any
rate the thought of them when unlimited is so overwhelming to us as to
lose all distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the
human mind, but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time,
or an existence out of time, which are the only possible explanations
of eternal duration, are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute
for them a hundred or a thousand years after death, and ask not what
will be our employment in eternity, but what will happen to us in that
definite portion of time; or what is now happening to those who passed
out of life a hundred or a thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the
wicked are suffering torments, or that the good are singing the praises
of God, during a period longer than that of a whole life, or of ten
lives of men? Is the suffering physical or mental? And does the worship
of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service? Who are the
wicked, and who are the good, whom we venture to divide by a hard and
fast line; and in which of the two classes should we place ourselves
and our friends? May we not suspect that we are making differences of
kind, because we are unable to imagine differences of degree?—putting
the whole human race into heaven or hell for the greater convenience of