_Soc._ And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are 454 artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what. _Gor._ Very true. _Soc._ Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? _Gor._ True. [Sidenote: _Knowledge and belief._] [Sidenote: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer?] _Soc._ Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question? _Gor._ I think so. _Soc._ Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? [Sidenote: Of persuasion in the courts and assemblies about the just and unjust.] _Gor._ I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust. _Soc._ And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another’s words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis. _Gor._ I think that you are quite right, Socrates. _Soc._ Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as ‘having learned’? _Gor._ Yes. _Soc._ And there is also ‘having believed’? _Gor._ Yes. [Sidenote: Knowledge and belief are not the same things; for there may be a false belief, but not a false knowledge.] _Soc._ And is the ‘having learned’ the same as ‘having believed,’ and are learning and belief the same things? _Gor._ In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. _Soc._ And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:—If a person were to say to you, ‘Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?’—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is. _Gor._ Yes. _Soc._ Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? _Gor._ No. _Soc._ No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ. _Gor._ Very true. _Soc._ And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded? [Sidenote: _What do we really mean concerning rhetoric?_] _Gor._ Just so. _Soc._ Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?