The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
And in a variety of ways,
it may be proved, that no one of these four is certain and firm.” Now,
this fifth division of Plato’s entirely respects ideas, considered as
flourishing in intellect; by a conjunction with which, we acquire true
intelligence, and the perfection of human knowledge. The first three of
the preceding are obnoxious to various mutations; the fourth less; but
the last is perfectly stable and invariable. The three first are rather
conversant about the qualities of things, about the image and shadow;
the fourth raises us to the participation of truth; but the fifth to
truth itself, and permanent essence. In the first degrees almost all
are conversant; in the fourth a few; in the fifth, all the gods, but a
very small part of mankind, as it is asserted in the Timæus. The four
first may be known, indeed, without the fifth, confusedly; but from
the knowledge of the fifth they become perfectly manifest, as effects
from the knowledge of their cause. But we cannot, by any means, attain
to the apprehension of the fifth, unless we have been first accurately
conversant with the rest; for from our imperfect condition we are
compelled to rise from difference to identity, from multitude to unity,
and from shadow to substance. While we investigate the knowledge of
things, if we are alone desirous to apprehend their resemblance (which
is the case with the multitude) we shall be placed in the third degree,
and may easily acquire the object of our pursuit. But if we should
fortunately possess the true philosophical genius, which is rare in the
extreme, and aspiring to the fifth degree, should, by a happy event,
attain to its conjunction, though such a contact is clearer and more
certain than all knowledge; yet it is difficult to express it in words,
and to manifest it to others. And the reason of this is obvious: first,
because words are wanting, which exactly correspond to the essence of a
thing, since these are only the symbols of shadows. Secondly, because
we speak with those, who are alone conversant with shadows, and are on
this account derided by them, when they find that our fifth does not,
by any means, accord with material resemblances, which they consider as
the only realities.