The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
It likewise always affirms the existence or non-existence of its
subject: such as, that motion is, and that from nothing nothing is
produced. Those which are not so perspicuous are called postulates, or
petitions; as that a circle may be described from any centre, and with
any radius; and such as these are properly hypotheses and postulates.
6. We have now seen the privilege assigned to the principles of
demonstration:--whether or no our decision has been just, the
ensuing considerations will evince. We said that the assumptions in
demonstration were more known than the conclusions,--not indeed without
reason, since through these our knowledge and belief of the conclusion
arises. For universally, that quality which is attributed to many
different things so as to be assigned to one through the medium of
another, abounds most in that medium by which it is transmitted to the
rest.
Thus the sun, through the medium of the moon, illuminates the earth by
night; thus the father loves the preceptor through the medium of his
child. And in the first instance the moon is more lucid than any object
it enlightens: in the second, the child possesses more of the father’s
regard than his preceptor. If then we assent to the conclusions through
our belief of the principles alone, it is necessary that the principles
should be more known, and inherit a greater degree of our assent.
Hence, if it be true that the principles are more known than the
conclusions, it follows, that either our knowledge of them is derived
from demonstration, or that it is superior to any demonstrative proof;
and after this manner we must conceive of those general self-evident
notions which, on account of their indemonstrable certainty, are
deservedly placed at the top of all human science.
These propositions not only possess greater credibility than their
conclusions, they likewise inherit this property as an accession to
their dignity and importance; that no contrary propositions deserve
greater belief; for if you give no more assent to any principle than
to its contrary, neither can you give more credit to the conclusion
deduced from that principle than to its opposite. Were this the
case, the doctrine of these propositions would immediately lose its
invariable certainty.
7. There are, indeed, some who, from erroneously applying what we
have rightly determined, endeavour to take away the possibility
of demonstration. From the preceding doctrine it appears that the
principles are more aptly known than the conclusions. This is not
evident to some, who think nothing can be known by us without a
demonstrative process; and consequently believe that the most
simple principles must derive all their credit from the light of
demonstration.