The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements — Plato — John Shaqi
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
But a question here occurs, If it be requisite that the propositions
which constitute demonstration should be peculiar to the science they
establish, after what manner are we to admit in demonstration those
axioms which are conceived in the most common and general terms; such
as, if from equal things you take away equals, the remainders shall be
equal:----as likewise, of every thing that exists, either affirmation
or negation is true? The solution is this: such principles, though
common, yet when applied to any particular science for the purposes
of demonstration, must be used with a certain limitation. Thus the
geometrician applies that general principle, if from equal things, &c.
not simply, but with a restriction to magnitudes; and the arithmetician
universally to numbers.
Thus too, that other general proposition:----of every thing,
affirmation or negation is true; is subservient to every art, but not
without accommodation to the particular science it is used by. Thus
number _is_ or is _not_, and so of others. It is not then
alone sufficient in demonstration that its propositions are true,
nor that they are immediate, or such as inherit an evidence more
illustrious than the certainty of proof; but, besides all these, it
is necessary they should be made peculiar by a limitation of their
comprehensive nature to some particular subject. It is on this
account that no one esteems the quadrature of Bryso[24], a geometrical
demonstration, since he uses a principle which, although true,
is entirely common. Previous to his demonstration he supposes two
squares described, the one circumscribing the circle, which will be
consequently greater; the other inscribed, which will be consequently
less than the given circle. Hence, because the circle is a medium
between the two given squares, let a mean square be found between
them, which is easily done from the principles of geometry; this mean
square, Bryso affirms, shall be equal to the given circle. In order to
prove this, he reasons after the following manner: those things which
compared with others without any respect, are either at the same time
greater, or at the same time less, are equal among themselves: the
circle and the mean square are, at the same time, greater than the
internal, and at the same time less than the external square; therefore
they are equal among themselves. This demonstration can never produce
science, because it is built only on one common principle, which may
with equal propriety be applied to numbers in arithmetic, and to times
in natural science. It is defective, therefore, because it assumes no
principle peculiar to the nature of the circle alone, but such a one as
is common to quantity in general.