The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Whether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or
they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential
care? And if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether
do they providentially superintend greater things, but neglect such as
are less? Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take
care of the greater? For if we deprive them of a providential attention
to all things similarly, through the want of power, how, while we
attribute to them a greater thing, viz. the production of all things,
can we refuse to grant that which is naturally consequent to this, a
providential attention to their productions? For it is the province
of the power which produces a greater thing, to dispose in a becoming
manner that which is less. But if they are curators of less things, and
neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence be right?
For that which is more allied, and more similar to any thing, is more
appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of
the good which that thing confers on it. If, however, the Gods think
that the first of mundane natures deserve their providential care,
and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable
to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can
restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things? What
is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy? How can
those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern
such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the
smallest things, not be the lords of the perfection of them, through
a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural
conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods must know what is
fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the
perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of
things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this
to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care
of all things, and an exuberance of power,--if this be the case, they
are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether,
also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence
in them? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power?
And on this account are things deprived[117] of their providential
care? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able
to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their
own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying
exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish
the hyparxis according to which they are essentialized. For the very
being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their
subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to
confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods