The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness?
And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should
not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by
the former demonstrations? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing
consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according
to every virtue. And again, it is consequent to this that they do not
withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures,
either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I
think it is also consequent that there is with them the most excellent
knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From
which it appears that they provide for the whole of things, and omit
nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about
secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that
this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established
remote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to
be defiled with the difficulty of administration, since even the life
of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation
and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments
of matter. If, however, it be requisite to define the mode of the
providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous,
unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all
things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of
every thing by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking externally, and
following their effects as men do in the providence which they exert
on their own affairs; but pre-assuming in themselves the measures of
the whole of things, and producing the essence of every thing from
themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all
things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good.
Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to nature,
energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deliberate
choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in
conjunction with will, are they deprived of production according to
essence; but they contract both these into one union, and they will
indeed such things as they are able to effect by their very being,
but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things,
they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant
will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with
the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls,
or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished,
unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is
laborious to the Gods? But that which is according to nature is not
laborious to any thing. For neither is it laborious to fire to impart