The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its
essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all
things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil.
For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps
some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that
he does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not only every
God is good, but that which is primarily boniform and beneficent is
God, (for that which is primarily good will not be the second after the
Gods, because every where, things which have a secondary subsistence,
receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis from those that subsist
primarily)--this being the case, it is perfectly necessary that
divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such goods as proceed
into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things. For as the
power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as the
power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the
power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as
well the beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phænomena,
and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and
binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to
one form,--after the same manner I think the first and most principal
good, and uniform hyparxis, establishes in and about itself, the causes
and comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good
which does not possess this power from it, nor beneficent which being
converted to it, does not participate of this cause. For all goods are
from thence produced, perfected and preserved; and the one series and
order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same
cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good,
and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsistence to
every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment contrary
to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of
the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt
from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and
from the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes
good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary
progeny; but the nature of goods proceeds from thence undefiled,
unmingled and uniform.