The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in
itself, extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant
participation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the
participation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good
in undefiled bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess
inevitably an allotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures
which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed
enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods; for it is not
possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a
being, or subsist at first; but receiving an efflux of this kind, they
neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled,
nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable
sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with
the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to order
indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue,
the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which
rank as wholes,[119] each of these is exempt from a perversion of this
kind, things more perfect in them always having dominion according
to nature. But partial natures through a diminution of power always
diverging[120] into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed
the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture
with good, and which is vanquished by the combination. For neither here
is it lawful for evil to subsist unmingled, and perfectly destitute of
good; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it
is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is
always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and which subsist
according to nature. But that which is preternatural is always evil to
partial natures, and deformity, privation of symmetry, perversion, and
a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For that which is corrupted,
is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection,
but to the universe it is incorruptible and indestructible.