The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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of goods; but evil originates from the imbecility of the recipients of
good, and a subsistence in the last of things. Nor is the evil which
has a shadowy subsistence in partial natures, unmingled with good. But
this participates of it in a certain respect, by its very existence
being detained by good. Nor in short, is it possible for evil which is
perfectly destitute of all good to have a subsistence. For evil itself
is even beyond that which in no respect whatever has an existence, just
as the good itself is beyond that which is perfectly being. Nor is the
evil which is in partial natures left in a disordered state, but even
this is made subservient to good purposes by the Gods, and on this
account justice purifies souls from depravity. But another order of
gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies. All things however
are converted as much as possible to the goodness of the Gods. And
wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and also the perfect
and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and imperfect natures
are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner, become subservient to
the completion of wholes, are called upward to the beautiful, are
changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the good, so far
as this can be accomplished by them.
For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than what the
Gods impart according to measures to their progeny: but all things,
each separately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as
it is possible for them to participate. But if some things are filled
with greater, and others with less goods, the power of the recipients,
and the measures of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of
this. For different things are adapted to different beings according to
their nature. But the Gods always extend good, in the same manner as
the sun always emits light. For a different thing receives this light
differently according to its order, and receives the greatest portion
of light it is capable of receiving. For all things are led according
to justice, and good is not absent from any thing, but is present to
every thing, according to an appropriate boundary of participation.
And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a good condition,
and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore say, that there are
precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or intellectual
paradigms of evils, in the same manner as there are of goods, or that
there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor
let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For
all these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote
from the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor
if certain persons speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise
things of this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent
apparatus of what they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things