The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
For intellect is sufficient to itself by participation, and soul by
illumination, but this universe, according to a similitude to a divine
nature. The Gods themselves, however, are self-sufficient through
and by themselves, filling themselves, or rather subsisting as the
plenitudes of all good.
But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall we
say it is? Is it such as that of a [naturally] circulating body? For
neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures,
nor is it filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the
disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the
celestial bodies is immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great
and venerable, as in corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the
nature of the Gods. For every body possesses both its being, and its
perpetual immutability from other precedaneous causes. But neither is
the impassive and the immutable in the Gods such as the immutability
of souls. For these communicate in a certain respect with bodies, and
are the media of an impartible essence, and of an essence divided
about bodies. Nor again is the immutability of intellectual essences
equivalent to that of the Gods. For intellect is immutable, impassive,
and unmingled with secondary natures, on account of its union with
the Gods. And so far indeed as it is uniform, it is a thing of this
kind; but so far as it is manifold, it has something which is more
excellent, and something which is subordinate, in itself. But the Gods
alone having established their unions according to this transcendency
of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive. For
there is nothing in them which is not one and hyparxis. But as fire
abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power,
as light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all
things without defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite
all multitude, and abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and
all-perfect division. But they deify every thing which participates
of them, receiving nothing from their participants, and do not[124]
diminish their own proper union by the participation.