The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
What therefore is it which unites us to the good? What is it which
causes in us a cessation of energy and motion? What is it which
establishes all divine natures in the first and ineffable unity
of goodness? And how does it come to pass that every thing being
established in that which is prior to itself according to the good
which is in itself, again establishes things posterior to itself
according to cause? It is, in short, the faith of the Gods, which
ineffably unites all the genera of the Gods, of dæmons, and of happy
souls to _the good_. For it is necessary to investigate _the
good_ neither gnostically, nor imperfectly, but giving ourselves
up to the divine light, and closing the eyes of the soul, after this
manner to become established in the unknown and occult unity of beings.
For such a kind of faith as this is more ancient than the gnostic
energy, not in us only, but with the Gods themselves, and according to
this all the Gods are united, and about one centre uniformly collect
the whole of their powers and progressions.
If however it be requisite to give a particular definition of this
faith, let no one suppose that it is such a kind of faith as that
which is conversant with the wandering about sensibles. For this
falls short of science, and much more of the truth of beings. But
the faith of the Gods surpasses all knowledge, and according to the
highest union conjoins secondary with first natures. Nor again, let
him conceive a faith of a similar species with the celebrated belief
in common conceptions; for we believe in common conceptions prior to
all reasoning. But the knowledge of these is divisible, and is by no
means equivalent to divine union; and the science of these is not only
posterior to faith, but also to intellectual simplicity. For intellect
is established beyond all science, both the first science, and that
which is posterior to it. Neither, therefore, must we say that the
energy according to intellect is similar to such a faith as this. For
intellectual energy is multiform, and is separated from the objects
of intellection through difference; and in short, it is intellectual
motion about the intelligible. But it is necessary that divine faith
should be uniform and quiet, being perfectly established in the port
of goodness. For neither is the beautiful, nor wisdom, nor any thing
else among beings, so credible and stable to all things, and so exempt
from all ambiguity, divisible apprehension and motion, as _the good_.
For through this intellect also embraces another union more ancient
than intellectual energy, and prior to energy. And soul considers the
variety of intellect and the splendour of forms as nothing with respect
to that transcendency of _the good_ by which it surpasses the whole of
things. And it dismisses indeed intellectual perception, running back
to its own hyparxis; but it always pursues, investigates, and aspires
after _the good_, hastens as it were to embosom it, and gives itself to