The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
this alone among all things without hesitation. But why is it necessary
to speak of the soul? For these mortal animals, as Diotima somewhere
says, despise all other things, and even life itself and being, through
a desire of the nature of _the good_; and all things have this one
immoveable and ineffable tendency to _the good_; but they overlook,
consider as secondary, and despise the order of every thing else. This,
therefore, is the one secure port of all beings.
This also is especially the object of belief to all beings. And
through this the conjunction and union with it is denominated faith
by theologists, and not by them only, but by Plato likewise, (if I
may speak what appears to me to be the case) the alliance of this
faith with truth and love is proclaimed in the Laws. The multitude
therefore are ignorant, that he who has a conception of these things,
when discoursing about their contraries, infers the same thing with
respect to the deviations from this triad. Plato then clearly asserts
in the Laws that the lover of falsehood is not to be believed, and
that he who is not to be believed is void of friendship. Hence it is
necessary that the lover of truth should be worthy of belief, and that
he who is worthy of belief should be well adapted to friendship. From
these things therefore, we may survey divine truth, faith and love,
and comprehend by a reasoning process their stable communion with each
other. If, however, you are willing, prior to these things we will
recall to our memory that Plato denominates that virtue fidelity which
conciliates those that disagree, and subverts the greatest of wars, I
mean seditions in cities. For from these things faith appears to be the
cause of union, communion and quiet. And if there is such a power as
this in us, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods themselves.
For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance, justice and
science, how is it possible that faith which connectedly comprehends
the whole order of the virtues should not subsist with the Gods? In
short, there are these three things which replenish divine natures,
and which are the sources of plenitude to all the superior genera of
beings, viz. goodness, wisdom and beauty. And again, there are three
things which collect together the natures that are filled, being
secondary indeed to the former, but pervading to all the divine orders,
and these are faith, truth and love. But all things are saved through
these, and are conjoined to their primary causes; some things indeed,
through the amatory mania, others through divine philosophy, and
others through theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human
wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic good, the purifying powers of
perfective good, and in short, all such things as are the effects of
divine possession. Concerning these things therefore, we may perhaps
again speak more opportunely.
CHAPTER XXVI.