denominate those beings Gods who are always conjoined with the Gods, and who together with them give completion to one series? For in many places he calls dæmons Gods, though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Phædrus and Timæus, and in other dialogues, you will find him extending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to dæmons. But what is still more paradoxical than these things, he does not refuse to call certain men Gods; for in the Sophista he thus denominates the Elean guest. From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that with respect to a God, one thing is simply a God, another according to union, another according to participation, another according to contact, and another according to similitude. For of superessential natures indeed, each is primarily a God; of intellectual natures, each is a God according to union; and of divine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine dæmons are Gods according to contact with the Gods; and the souls of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls intellect itself divine; but that which is divine is posterior to the first deity, in the same manner as that which is united is posterior to _the one_, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more uniform and simple have the precedency; but the series of beings ends in _the one itself_. Let this, therefore, be the definition and distinction of that which is divine.