The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Again, let us, if you are willing, from other dialogues investigate
the common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and
what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according
to nature? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to
our memory what is written in the Phædo? Socrates therefore says in
the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived
from its similitude to divinity, that the essence which is superior
to the soul, (and to which the soul is naturally similar, and being
similar participates of an immortal allotment) is divine and immortal,
intelligible and uniform, indissoluble and possesses an invariable
sameness of subsistence; but that the essence which is inferior to
the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which also it pertains to be
corrupted and to be passive. For a thing of this kind is sensible
and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite; and he
predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal
subsistence. Let us therefore direct our attention to these common
dogmas, and examine after what manner each of them pertains to the Gods.
In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of
that which is said to be divine? From what has been said therefore,
it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union
of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to
be superessential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers
of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that
which is divine, is not only hyparxis and _the one_ in each order
of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that
which is participated; of which the latter is a God, but the former is
divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is
something which is separate and participated will be evident in what
follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a
thing of this kind, viz. being which participates of _the one_,
or _the one_ subsisting contractedly together with being. For we
assume all things in the Gods except _the one_, as suspended from
them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do
not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these
in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not
to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each
other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the
participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods.
For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God,
but also Socrates in the Phædrus. For he says “that all the horses
and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good;” and
afterwards still more clearly, “and this is the life of the Gods.”
But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should