The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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After this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the
uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness
of subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of,
and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed,
has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and
appears to be especially adapted to that which is primarily being,[131]
and in which also every participable genus of unities ends. For _the
one_ is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the
indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes
according to divine union; since the dissoluble is such as it is
through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude
into one. And that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence is
eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the Gods; from which also
the participation of immortality and eternal sameness is derived to
other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the
divine; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal; and
that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to
the intelligible.
And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted
to each other? For the first of these, through the first unity which
is participated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform.
For if a God subsists according to _the one_, that which is divine
will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life
is immortal, is also similarly indissoluble. For life is the bond
of dissoluble natures; which also Timæus indicating to us, opposes
the dissoluble to the immortal: “for you are not immortal, says the
demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject[132] to
the fatality of death.” Every thing mortal, therefore, is dissoluble;
but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated
immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal.
For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes,
according to each opposition. But the third of these being established
according to the plenitude of whole intelligibles subsists at once
and is invariably the same. For the intelligible is the cause of
sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is
entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and
most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the
before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider
hereafter.