The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention
to the unbegotten in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it
to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and
Socrates demonstrates in the Phædrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior
to these, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations
and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define
the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to
what reason? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation,
not only from that which subsists in the parts of time, such as we
assert the generation of material natures to be, nor from that only
which is extended into the whole of time, such as Timæus demonstrates
the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but also from the
psychical generation? Since Timæus denominates this to be unbegotten
according to time, but to be the best of generated natures. And in
short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential
separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a
union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the
natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves
the things produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unseparated and
the united are in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations
of the Gods are spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as in the
fable of Diotima, the generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love
at the birth of Venus, it is necessary not to be ignorant after what
manner things of this kind are asserted, and that they are composed
for the sake of symbolical indication; and that fables for the sake of
concealment call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes,
_generation_. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the first cause
is on this account denominated Time; since again, for another reason,
it is thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to cause
may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the progression
of the Gods from the best of causes is properly denominated generation
according to time. To Plato, therefore, mythologizing, it is adapted
to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but when he
is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding divine
natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him to
celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods. For the Gods primarily
establish in themselves the paradigm of non-generation. But an
intellectual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten, and after this
the psychical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance
of unbegotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have
indefinitely shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods,
therefore, are unbegotten. But there is an order in them of first,
middle, and last progressions, and a transcendency and subjection of
powers.