The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Farther still, if the many alone have a subsistence (as has been said)
all things will be infinitely infinite; and if you receive any one
of the infinites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite.
And with respect to the things from which this consists and which are
infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something
of the many be assumed, which we say is not one, this therefore will
be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings,
but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this also will consist
of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these
manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many.
There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and
in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will
be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite,
or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which
will not be something of this kind; since a part is many, and in a
similar manner the part of a part; and this to infinity. For multitude
proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being
deprived of the nature of _the one_. To make beings however, to be
infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to
the thing proposed by us. For if being is infinitely infinite, being
can neither be known, nor discovered; since the infinite is entirely
incomprehensible and unknown. If also being is infinitely infinite,
there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that
something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however,
which is less infinite; since it is not perfectly infinite, will
evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the
infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is itself according
to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude
there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will
be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible.
Hence there is not the infinitely infinite.