The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be
according to the same, similar and dissimilar. For if all the manys
are not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that
which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence
of the privation of _the one_. All things therefore being deprived of
_the one_, after the same manner, they will on this account subsist
similarly with respect to each other. But things which subsist
similarly, so far as they thus subsist, are evidently similar to each
other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are
deprived of _the one_. They will likewise according to this privation
of _the one_ be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things
which are similar should suffer the same passion; so that things which
do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But
things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing.
Hence things which are deprived of every one, will not suffer any thing
that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dissimilar
according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is impossible
for the many to exist which are in no respect one.
Moreover, the many will be the same with and different from each other
according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of _the
one_, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they will be
the same according to this privation; since things which subsist after
the same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which
are after the same manner deprived according to privation. But so far
in short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many
will be different from each other. For if _the one_ in the many is the
same, that which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same.
The many therefore will be the same and not the same with each other.
But if they are the same and not the same it is evident that they are
different from each other. For that which is the same and not the same,
so far as it is not the same, is not the same, by nothing else than the
different. Farther still therefore, these many will be moveable and
immoveable, if _the one_ is not. For if each of them is not one, they
will be immoveable according to the privation of _the one_. For if that
which is not one should be changed, each of them would have _the one_;
since privations being changed, entirely lead into habits the things
that are changed. It is necessary however that what is not one should
remain immoveable according to the privation of _the one_, though
this very thing is itself impossible, viz. that the many should stand
still. For every thing which stands still is in something which is the
same, viz. it is either in the same form, or in the same place. But
every thing which is in the same, is in one thing which is the same.
For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing therefore which