The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another
manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what
has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore,
that there should either be one principle, or many principles; or
rather, we should begin from hence. And if there are many principles,
they must either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be
divulsed from each other, and they must be either finite or infinite.
But if there is one principle, this must either be not essence, or
essence. And if it is essence, this must either be corporeal or
incorporeal. And if incorporeal, it must either be separate from, or
inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it must either be moveable
or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must either be inferior
to all essence, or participated by essence, or imparticipable. If
therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with
each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will
they be common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what
communication can there be between things which are naturally foreign,
or what co-operation between things which are entirely of a different
kind? In addition also to these things, there will be _the many_ which
do not participate of _the one_. For if there is a certain one common
in all of them, they will not be perfectly separated essentially from
each other. If therefore they are different, and there is nothing which
is the same about them, they are alone many and by no means one. But if
there are many principles, and which possess sympathy with each other,
they will have something common, which leads all of them to sympathy,
and similarly unfolds all of them to the view. For we call those things
sympathetic, which happen to be passive to the same thing. But similars
are entirely similar from participating one form and one nature. If
however this be the case, it is necessary that that all [or universal]
which is every where, and in all the principles, should be of a more
principal nature than the many. This therefore gives them the power to
generate sympathy with each other, and affords them communion according
to nature.