if indeed, it is _the one itself_, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of multitude or of nothing. For if this participates, it is evident that some other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view, and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely void of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true, viz. that _the many_ do not participate of _the one_, nor _the one_ of _the many_. I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one. But there is indeed a certain one in the many, and there is also the imparticipable one, and which is simply one, and nothing else. If however that which is prior to both, is _not[137] one_, it is necessary that this _not one_ should be more excellent than _the one_. All things however are, and are generated what they are, through _the one_. And together with _the one_ indeed every being is preserved; but separate from _the one_ proceeds to the corruption of itself. The mixture also of _the one_ and _multitude_, which the non-one affords to beings, is communion and union. _The one_[138] therefore, and that which is _not one_,[139] are the cause of nothing else to beings than of their being one. If however _the one_ is the cause of a thing of this kind, that which is _not one_ will not be the cause of that which is more excellent [than union.] But it is every where necessary that what is more excellent should be the cause to beings of another more excellent thing, according to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excellent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less goodness. From these things therefore it is necessary, that _the many_ should participate of _the one_, that _the one_ should be unmingled with _multitude_, and that nothing should be better than _the one_, but that this should also be the cause of being to _the many_. For every thing which is deprived of _the one_, flies immediately into nothing, and to its own corruption. But that which is not many, is not at one and the same time not many and nothing. For to _the one_ that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and to _the many_ that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, _the one_ and _the many_ are not the same, the not being many will not be the same with nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that _the one_ is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to _the many_. CHAPTER II.