Shall we say, therefore, that being itself and essence are participated by all things that in any respect whatever have a subsistence? But how is this possible? For that which is in generation, or passing into existence, is said to be, and is destitute of essence. Nor must we wonder, if it also, since it ranks among beings, should now participate of essence. For so far as it is in generation, it is not; but it ends in existence and essence when it is now actually generated, and is no longer rising into existence. All things, therefore, that have in any respect whatever a subsistence, do not participate of essence. What then will that be which is every where and by all things participated? Let us consider every being, and see what that is to which all beings are passive, and what it is which is common in all of them, as in essence, sameness, difference, permanency, and motion. Can we say, therefore, that each of these is any thing else than one thing, and not only separately, but this is also the case with the things which subsist from them; and in short, it is not possible in a certain respect to speak otherwise of all things, than this, that all things, and each thing is one. For if any thing should be deprived of _the one_, though you should speak of parts, or of beings, immediately, that which becomes destitute of _the one_, will be altogether nothing. Or with what intention do we say that a thing which is not is perfectly nothing, [or not even one thing] unless _the one_ is the last thing which deserts beings? This it is, therefore, to become that which in no respect is, and to be perfectly deprived of _the one_. For it is possible for that which is not moved to be, and for that which has no being to have an hyparxis; but that which is not even one thing, and which is destitute of _the one itself_, will be entirely nothing. Hence _the one_ is present with all beings; and though you should speak of multitude itself, it is necessary that this also should participate of _the one_; for if it does not become one thing, it is not possible for it to subsist. And if even you divide the whole to infinity, immediately nothing else than one occurs. For either that which is divided does not subsist, or becoming to be, or subsisting something else, it will be immediately one.[142] _The one_, therefore, which is every where apparent, and is in all beings, and which deserts no being whatever, is either derived from _the one_ which is simply one, or from that which is more excellent than _the one_. For it is not possible for _the one_ to be otherwise passive, [i.e. to be consubsistent with something else] than from the first one, to which _the one_ is no longer present, but which is _the one itself_, or nothing else than one.