The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Again, therefore, from another principle we may arrive at the same
conclusion, by speaking as follows: It is necessary either that the
causes of beings and things caused should proceed to infinity, and that
there should be nothing first or last in beings; or that there should
be no first, but that there should be the last of things, infinity
existing in one part only. Or on the contrary, it is necessary that
beings should proceed to infinity from a definite principle, or that
there should be a certain first and last, and a boundary of beings each
way. And if there are boundaries of beings, things either proceed from
each other, and the generation of beings is in a circle; or if they
are not from each other, either one of them is from another, or the
first indeed is one, but the last not one, or the contrary, or both are
one, or each is not one. If, therefore, first things, and the causes
of beings are infinite, each thing will consist of infinites. For that
which proceeds from a certain principle, must necessarily participate
of that principle from which it proceeds. But that which derives its
subsistence from many causes, will be in its own nature multiform,
as participating of many powers. And that which is produced from
infinites prior to itself, will have infinite peculiarities derived
from the principles, and adapted to itself. Every being, therefore,
being infinite, and consisting of infinites, will render all things
infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a knowledge of any
being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the infinite is
perfectly unknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to whom it is
infinite.