Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary either that the first principle should be one, or that there should be alone many[143] first principles, or one containing multitude in itself, or many participating of one. But if there are many first principles only, there will not be one thing from them. For what will make one and a whole, if there are many principles, and there is nothing which produces one? For it is certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be assimilated to them. Either, therefore, there will not be _the one_ in any being, or it will not be from these principles; so that each of the things which in any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multitude alone. And again each of the parts of any being will be a thing of this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute parts essence and existence. For all things will be many, and _the one_ will be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes or parts be apparent. But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and that they should participate of _the one_, _the one_ will be coordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the uncoordinated should every where be more ancient than the coordinated, and the exempt than the participated. For how is _the one_ in each of the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself according to the communion of _the one_? Again, if the first one were multiplied, _the one_ will be passive; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unmingled with an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where the simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. _The one_ therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude; and that which is one, and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended[144] from that which is primarily one; through the principle, indeed, participating of _the one_, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now manifestly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation. CHAPTER IV.