The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be
older and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and
each thing will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether
these are from each other, or the things which subsist between these.
For the extremes being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation
according to essence should intervene? But if the one is from the
other, whether is the first derived from the last, as some say, who
generate things more excellent from things subordinate, and things more
perfect from such as are more imperfect? In this case, however, must
not that which is allotted the power of generating and producing the
perfect, by a much greater priority perfect and adorn itself by its
present power? And how is it possible that leaving itself to be of an
inferior allotment it should definitely assign a more excellent order
to another thing? For every thing aspires after its proper perfection,
and simply desires good; though not every thing is able to participate
of a thing of this kind. If, therefore, it has the power of producing
this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on account
of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all
perfection, will be first established in itself.
But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and
the most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each
of them one, or is this one, but that not one? If, however, that which
is first, or that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be
first or last. For, as there will be multitude in each, each of them
will have the better and the worse; and neither will that which is
best be unmingled with that which is inferior to it, nor that which
is the most obscure of all things according to being, have so great a
subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect nature; but there will
be something more extreme than that which is last, and something more
perfect than that which is first. For every where, that which is best
if it receives another addition through that which is inferior will be
more perfect than that which does not abide in the best, [through not
receiving this very addition.] If, therefore, we rightly assert these
things, _the one_ is the principle of all things, and the last
of beings is one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the
progression of beings should be assimilated to the principle, and that
as far as to this, the power of the first should proceed.