The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same
thing to those who are able to know wholes from parts, viz. that
intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all.
Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of
which participating in every respect sufficiently it will reap the
fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he in the first place
removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect,
because neither is this replete with all the elements of _the
good_. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of
the first intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not
to be defined according to this alone, is it not necessary that in
wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual
perfection? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according
to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,]
self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the
participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from
_the good_, and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in
order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine intellect
always participates of _the good_, and on this account is divine. For
it is boniform through the participation of good; but divine, as being
suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore,
which infers that _the good_ is exempt from the first intellect, and
which defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in
the all-perfect presence of _the good_. For the intellectual form of
energy is itself by itself defective with respect to blessedness.
And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most
clearly the difference of _the one_ from essence and being, and shows
that _the one_ is exempt from all other things and from essence; for
this he evinces of _the one_ at the end of the first hypothesis. But
how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt
from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the
intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in intellect
there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that _the
one_ transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the
ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect?
And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but
_the one_ is demonstrated to be neither in itself, nor in another,
how can we any longer consider intellect as the same with the first
cause of all? In what respect, also, will _the one_ which is prior to
being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second
hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle
of all? For the one being participates of _the one_; but that which
participates is secondary to that which is participated. That _the
one_, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and