The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.
CHAPTER V.
In the next place, if _the one_ is neither intelligible nor
intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let
us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through
what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to
his familiars, the ineffable and unknown transcendency of the first.
I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the
similitude of secondary natures; but at another time he demonstrates
its exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things,
through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the
ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of _the good_, through analogy
to the sun; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the difference
of _the one_ with respect to all things posterior to it through
negations. But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold
the progression from the first cause of all other things, and prior
to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first
cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every
where cause is established above its effects; and on this account the
first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him.
For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same
time of non-beings. But again, according to the other of these modes,
he adumbrates the conversion to the first of the things which have
proceeded from it. For in each order of beings, through similitude
to it there is a monad analogous to _the good_, which has the same
relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that _the good_ has
to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude
is entirely the conversion of the whole of things to _the good_.
These, therefore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the
progression indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the
first through negations; but the conversion of all things demonstrates
this to us through analogies. Let not, however, any one considering
these negations to be such things as privations despise such a mode
of discussion, nor defining the sameness in words analogously, and
words in habitudes, endeavour to calumniate this anagogic progression
to the first principle. For negations, as it appears to me, extend
a triple peculiarity in things. And at one time, indeed, being more
primogenial than affirmations, they are procreative and perfective
of the generation of them. But at another time, they are allotted an
order coordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in no respect
more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time, they are
allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else
than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with
which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as