The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first
principle, through the things which proceed from, and are converted
to it; and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to
that which is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by
beings, nor is effable by any one of all things; but being exempt from
all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible,
it produces from itself according to one cause all knowledge, every
thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended by
speech. But its unical nature, and which transcends all division,
shines forth to the view dyadically in the natures posterior to it,
or rather triadically. For all things abide in, proceed from, and are
converted to _the one_. For at one and the same time, they are united
to it, are in subjection to its union which is exempt from the whole of
things, and desire the participation of it. And union indeed imparts a
stable transcendency to all secondary natures, and which subsists in
unproceeding conjunction with the cause of them. But subjection defines
the progression of beings, and their separation from the imparticipable
and first unity. And desire perfects the conversion of the subsisting
natures, and their circular tendency to the ineffable. First natures
therefore, being always entirely united, [to the ineffable] some more
remotely, but others more proximately, and receiving through this union
their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we endeavour to manifest
through names the progression and conversion of the whole of things.
But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it be lawful so to
speak, in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this as being
incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge, those who
were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by words. But
as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places, and
is exempt from all beings, thus also the union of all things with it
is occult, ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For every being is
united to it, neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor
the energy of essence; since things which are destitute of knowledge
are united to the first, and things deprived of all energy, participate
according to their order of a conjunction with it. That which is
unknown therefore in beings according to their union with the first,
we neither endeavour to know, nor to manifest by names, but being more
able to look to their progression and conversion, we ascribe indeed to
the first two names, which we derive as resemblances from secondary
natures. We also define two modes of ascent to the first, conjoining
that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of _the good_,
but that which is through negations with the appellation of _the one_;
which Plato also indicating, in the Republic indeed calls the first
_the good_, and at the same time makes a regression to it through