The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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The mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to _the one_ is, as
we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names
of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it _the good_,
and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites
intellect and intelligibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such
a principle as this _the one_, and shows that it gives subsistence to
the divine unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the
image of the progression of the whole of things, but the other of their
conversion. For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and
proceed from the first principle, on this account referring _the one_
to it, we demonstrate that it is the cause of all multitude and every
progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except from
_the one_? But because again the progressions from it are naturally
converted to it, and desire its ineffable and incomprehensible
hyparxis, we denominate it _the good_. For what else is that which
converts all things, and which is extended to all beings as the object
of desire, but _the good_? For all other things subsist distributedly,
and are to some beings honourable, but to others not. And every thing
which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence aspires
after some things, and avoids others. But _the good_ is the common
object of desire to all beings, and all things according to their
nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however of desiring
natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire. _The good_
therefore converts, but _the one_ gives subsistence to all secondary
natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on
this account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubled. For
here indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior
to it, and to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to
it. Because, indeed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the
appellation of _the one_; but because all things even as far as to
things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we
denominate it _the good_.