The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in
this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle.
For he suspends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible
monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful
itself, all good things from _the good_, and all equal things from the
equal itself. And again, he considers some things as intelligibles, but
others as sensibles; but the summits of them are uniformly established
in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to
ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness
which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends that all intelligibles,
and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through
it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad uncoordinated
with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of
sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the
intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with
intelligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their
divine hyparxis.
Let not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same
order of _the good_ in intelligible forms, as there is prior to
intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the
beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms
which are in intelligibles. For the first good, which by conjoining the
article with the noun we are accustomed to call τἀγαθον or _the good_,
is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all
beings both in dignity and power; since Socrates also, when discussing
the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and
the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all
the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again,
particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each
thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible
things that are beautiful and good, and in short from things that
are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to
the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences,
from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing
beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader
of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each
form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first
good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things
beautiful, as Plato elsewhere says; and “all things are for its sake,
and it is the cause of every thing beautiful.”