The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in
forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but
_the good_ prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above
all knowledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection;
but the latter is the supplier of good to the Gods so far as they are
Gods, and is generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must
not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle
_the good_, from the name of idea, that he directly calls it the
intelligible goodness; but though the first principle is superior to
all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause
of every thing beautiful and good, transferring through the things
which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I
think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about _the good_,
that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise
beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the sun. And
after a certain admirable manner he presents us with an epitome of the
negations of _the one_ in the Parmenides. For the assertion that _the
good_ is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one
and the same time separates it from the superessential unities, and
every genus of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible
orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these are the first
things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are
taken away from the principle of the whole of things.