The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and
which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic
hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole
orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence
of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and
that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled
with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist
uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not unprolific, but it is
by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-establishes
a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence. Nor does its
fecundity tend to multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled
purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which
are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires
to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things
its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary
that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is
not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful
so to speak) should be generative of the whole of things, and give
subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all
things, and by being imparticipable, similarly generating the first and
the last of beings.
You must not, however, suppose that this generation and progression is
emitted in consequence of _the good_ either being moved, or multiplied,
or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are
secondary to the singleness of the first. For whether _the good_ is
moved, it will not be _the good_; since _the good itself_, and which
is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How,
therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce
other things when deprived of good? Or whether _the good_ is multiplied
through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things
through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For
that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens
to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through
a diminution and want of its own power. But if _the good_ produces all
things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about
it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and
power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily
good will be indigent. But if to be _the good itself_ is sufficient
to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all
things, why do we assume power as an addition? For additions in the
Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let _the good_ therefore
alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the
progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does _the good_ energizing give