The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power
does it fill all things with powers, nor being multiplied do all things
participate of good, nor being moved do all beings[149] enjoy the first
principle. For _the good_ precedes all powers, and all energies, and
every multitude and motion; since each of these is referred to _the
good_ as to its end. _The good_ therefore is the most final of all
ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable natures,
indeed, impart an end to secondary beings; but that which presubsists
uncircumscribed by all things is the first good.
CHAPTER VIII.
After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the
conceptions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to
Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable
and immense transcendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with
us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato,
and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them
intellectual Gods; but that Plato does not think fit to co-arrange or
connumerate _the good_ with secondary natures. For such a connumeration
ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency of
_the good_ with respect to other things, nor in short, must it be said
that _the good_ contributes as the first with reference to another
second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with
other natures; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad
and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods.
How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings _the good_ which
is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co-arrange one as
the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third? Some
one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of
the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one,
however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remarkably accord
with us who assert _the good_ to be imparticipable, to transcend all
the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above
all the divine monads.