The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things,
and says that all things are for his sake, and that he is the cause of
all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who
consider his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by
introducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But
that we do not assert these things connumerating [the first God with
secondary natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first
king the first, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that
some things are about him, as he says that second things are about
that which is second, and third things about that which is third,
but[150] he says, in short, that all things are about him. And to the
other kings, indeed, he introduces number and a divided kingdom; but
to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor
a distribution of dominion opposite to that of the others. Such a mode
of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with
the other kings, nor co-arranges him as the leader of a triad with the
second and third power. For of a triadic division the first monad,
indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are coordinate with
itself; but the second of second; and the third of third orders. If,
however, some one should apprehend that the first monad is the leader
of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third
allotments; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension is
different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to the
king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one
reason and one order; but to the first of the triad, things first are
subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things
second and third should be subservient according to their communion
with the remaining kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by
Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause,
and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the Gods? Since
he says that this cause similarly reigns over all things, that all
things subsist about him, and that for his sake essence and energy are
inherent in all things.