Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause[156] inferior to the final. Whence also Plotinus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is _the good_. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about _the good_, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed _the good_ ineffable, as it is fit it should, but from the habitude of things posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of _the good_, it excites in us the conception of the communion and co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that _the good_ is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore _the one_ and _the good_, from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But _the about_ which (το περι ο,) the _on account of which_ (το δι’ ο[157]), and _the from which_ (το αφ’ ου,) particularly subsist in the intelligible Gods: and from these they are ascribed to the first God. For whence can we suppose the unical Gods derive their peculiarities, except from that which is prior to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term _about_ is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term _on account of which_ pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term _from which_ is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly. These things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.