The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
CHAPTER X.
In the next place, let us finish the discussion concerning the first
God, with the theory of Parmenides, and unfold the mystic conceptions
of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For
we shall refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them
to our commentaries on that dialogue. In the first place therefore,
it is requisite to determine this concerning the first hypothesis,
that it comprehends as many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis
which follows it does affirmatively. For this latter demonstrates all
the orders proceeding from _the one_; but the former evinces that _the
one_ is exempt from all the divine genera. From both these hypotheses
however, it is obvious to every one how it is necessary that the cause
of the whole of things should transcend his productions. For because
_the one_ is the cause of all the Gods, he transcends all things. And
because he is exempt from them through transcendency, on this account
he gives to all things their hypostases. For through being expanded
above all things he causes all things to subsist. Since in the second
and third orders also of beings, causes which are entirely exempt from
their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their progeny than
those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And _the one_
by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unically
established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause
is every where different from the things caused. And on this account
nature indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies;
but soul being perfectly perpetual, is the cause of things generated;
and intellect being immoveable is the cause of every thing that is
moved. If, therefore, according to each progression of beings effects
are denied of their causes, it is certainly necessary to take away all
things similarly from the cause of all.