The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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In the third place after these, we may survey the order which is
allotted the boundary of the intellectual and at the same time
intelligible Gods, proceeding from _the one_, and may behold _the one_
perfectly expanded above it. For this order indeed subsists from the
second genera, and from the intellectual wholeness of the genera. But
_the one_, as has been demonstrated, is exempt according to cause from
this wholeness. _The one_ therefore has neither beginning, or middle,
or end, nor has it extremes, nor does it participate of any figure.
For through these Gods, the before mentioned order of Gods becomes
apparent. Whether therefore, there be a perfective summit, or what
is celebrated as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination
converting the end of these divinities to their beginning, _the one_ is
similarly beyond every triple distribution. For _the one_ would have
parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind.
But it has been demonstrated that _the one_ unically subsists prior to
the many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of
them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one negation
of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of
the last order. Besides this also, he shows that _the one_ has no
extremity. But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately
from this he likewise shows that _the one_ is unreceptive of all
figures.
Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention
to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these, and receiving a
tripartite division, and must demonstrate that _the one_ transcends
these also. For such is _the one_, says Parmenides, since it is neither
in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on
all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where
touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a
figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and
not one. And if it were in itself it would entirely comprehend itself
in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended,
it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. The discourse
therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that _the one_
will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one
endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence _the one_ being
perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this
summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods
placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and
being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.