The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding
from intellect, and unfolding itself into light? What other can we
assert it to be than that which is the most simple and the most known
of all the conceptions contained in this science? What therefore is
this? “_The one_, says Parmenides, if it is _the one_ will not be
many.” For it is necessary that the many should participate of _the
one_; but _the one_ does not participate of _the one_, but is _the
one_ itself. Neither is that which is primarily one participable. For
it would not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor that which
is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate.
_The one_ therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist
primarily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in
_the intelligible place of survey_, as we are taught in the second
hypothesis. _The one_, therefore, entirely transcends an order of this
kind, and is the cause of it. For the _not many_, is not privation, as
we have said, but the cause of the many. This, therefore, Parmenides
does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but as a thing most
manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the opposition
as it were of the many to _the one_. But employing this he takes away
that which follows; and he takes away that which is posterior to this
by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does,
after the same manner. And at one time indeed, he assumes the elements
of the demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time
from those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order
of Gods, as we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which
connectedly contains and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt
cause. But this order is called by him in the second hypothesis parts
and a whole. These therefore he denies of _the one_ employing the many
for the purpose of distinguishing the subjects and _the one_. For, as
he says, that which is a whole and has parts is many; but _the one_ is
beyond the many. If, therefore, _the one_ transcends the intelligible
simplicity, but whole and that which has parts proceed from it in
order to become the bond of the whole of this distribution, is it not
necessary that _the one_ should neither be a whole, nor be indigent
of parts? And I think it is through this transcendency that _the one_
presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods, and that it produces
this order, but in an exempt manner.