The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
For it is not possible that what is generated,
should at once receive all the abundance of its generator. And it is
necessary that the prolific power of every thing that preexists in
the cause[160] itself should become apparent. The monad therefore
gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to number which
distributes the peculiarities that abide collectively in itself. Since
however, as was before observed, the similar is always more allied to
cause than the dissimilar, there will be one multitude of similars to
the monad, proceeding from the monad; and another of dissimilars. But
again, the multitude which is similar to the monad is that in a divided
manner which the monad is indivisibly. For if the monad possesses a
peculiar power and hyparxis, there will be the same form of hyparxis in
the multitude together with a remission with reference to the whole.
After this however, it is necessary to consider in the third place,
that of progressions, such as are nearer to their cause are indicative
of a greater multitude of things, and are at the same time in a
certain respect equal to their containing causes; but that such as are
more remote possess a less extended power of signification; and on
account of the diminution of their power, change and diminish at the
same time the amplitude of production. For if, of progressions, that
which subsists the first in order is more similar to its principle,
and that which gives subsistence to the greatest number is both with
respect to essence and power more similar to the generating principle
of all things, it is necessary that of secondary natures, such as
are nearer to the monad, and which receive dominion after it, should
give a greater extent to their productions; but that such things as
are more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade
in a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious
energies to far distant progressions. And again, as similar to this, it
is necessary that the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest
number of effects, should be arranged next to the monad its principle;
and that the nature generative of a more numerous progeny, because it
is more similar to the supplying cause of all things than that which is
generative of a few, must be arranged nearer to the monad, according to
hyparxis. For if it is more remote, it will be more dissimilar to the
first principle; but if it is more dissimilar, it will neither possess
a power comprehending the power of similar natures, nor an energy
abundantly prolific. For an abundant cause is allied to the cause of
all. And universally, that which is generative of a more abundant, is
more naturally allied to its principle than that which is productive
of a less numerous progeny. For the production of fewer effects is a
defect of power; but a defect of power is a diminution of essence; and
a diminution of essence becomes redundant on account of dissimilitude