The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or
different from intellect? For as the body which participates of soul is
perfect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect.
And of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason,
all things do not participate: but of intellect and intellectual
illumination rational souls participate, and also such things as
partake of any kind of knowledge. And soul indeed energizes according
to time; but intellect comprehends in eternity both its essence,
and at the same time its stable energy. And not every soul indeed is
adapted to preserve immutably and without diminution the perfection
of itself; but every intellect is always perfect, and possesses a
never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellectual genus
therefore is essentially beyond the psychical; since the former,
neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the
nature of evil; but the latter being undefiled in whole souls, departs
in partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is
the first of beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the
extent of life? For soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with
life; and intellect is the best and most perfect, and as we have said,
an eternal life. But the life of intellect is indeed in a certain
respect intellectual, and is mingled from the intellectual and vital
peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there should be life itself.
Whether therefore is life or intellect the more excellent thing? But
if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but such beings as
are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say that
plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged
above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and
imparting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What
then? Is life the first of beings? And is _to live_ the same
thing _as to be_? But this is impossible. For if life is that
which is primarily being, and to be vital is the same thing as to have
being, and there is the same definition of both life and being, every
thing which participates of life would also participate of being, and
every thing which participates of existence would likewise participate
of life. For if each is the same thing all things would similarly
participate of being and life. All vital natures indeed have essence
and being; but there are many beings that are destitute of life. Being
therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that which is more
universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to
_the one_, as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is
that which is primarily established above bodies; but intellect is
beyond soul;[170] life is more ancient than intellect; and being which
is primarily being is established above all these. Every thing also
which participates of soul, by a much greater priority participates of