The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle
of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as
self-perfect monads, participated by beings.[169] How many orders
therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show
what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various
hyparxis. Of all beings then, the last is that which is corporeal.
For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more
ancient cause, and is neither allotted simplicity nor composition,
nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body
is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten; but every thing which
is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause,
is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause
of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of
existence. For never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or
depart from its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is
corrupted through being separated from the power that supplied it with
being. But that which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated
from itself, is allotted through itself a perpetual essence. No body
however, since it is not the cause of perpetuity to itself, will be
perpetual. For every thing which is perpetual possesses an infinite
power. But body being finite is not the cause of infinite power. For
infinite power is incorporeal, because all power is incorporeal.
But this is evident, because greater powers are every where. But no
body is capable of being wholly every where. If therefore, no body
imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or finite, but
that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being,
and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence
therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted
proximately to supply them with being? Must we not say that the cause
of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders
the nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are
deprived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the
province of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence
of secondary natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of
essence. What therefore is that of which bodies participating, are
said to be better than the bodies which do not participate of it? Is
it not evident that it is soul? For we say that animated bodies are
more perfect than such as are inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily
beyond bodies; and it must be admitted that all heaven and every thing
corporeal is the vehicle of soul. Hence, these two orders of beings
present themselves to our view; the one indeed being corporeal, but the
other which is above this, psychical.