The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
In the next place let us show what the third[180] thing is which
presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where
therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence
from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the
infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which
have a subsistence from both these, as Socrates himself clearly
teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the
first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is
highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being.
My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we
demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all
things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that life
is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually; and also that these
three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things
presubsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life
and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings. Life however is the
middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life.
But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect.
For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the
intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelligibly, but in
intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.
And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven
together with the first principles, and does not depart from _the one_.
But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent
with infinite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to
the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one
intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is
mingled from the first principles, and is triple, one thing which it
contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another
intellectually, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I
mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is
the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole
of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in
each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving
its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is
especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life
is intelligence, and being is intelligible. If however every being is
mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence
is that which subsists as mingled from the two principles proceeding
from _the one_. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation
in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, “that
God has exhibited bound and infinity.” For they are unities deriving
their subsistence from _the one_, and as it were luminous patefactions
from the imparticipable and first union.