The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Since, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of
intelligibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them,
and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which
is the first of intelligibles, and how is it denominated by Timæus? He
says therefore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds
according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of
eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one,
in which Timæus says eternity abides? For it is necessary either to say
that it is the one of eternity, or _the one_ which transcends all
intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say
that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing
can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither
admits the habitude nor communion of secondary natures with itself? For
every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all
sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however
perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any
being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose
that it is the one of eternity, in which Timæus says eternity abides,
in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however,
that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding
in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior
to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the
same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in
less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what
shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself?
For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its
generation prior to that which is inferior to it. If therefore eternity
can neither abide in itself, nor in _the one_ which is prior to
beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timæus, _it is
established in the one of the first triad_, or rather in the whole
of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the
cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle
triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their
conversion to their principle.
CHAPTER XVIII.