The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to
our view, according to the doctrine of Timæus, viz. animal itself,
eternity, and the one. And through this one, and the firm establishment
in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through
eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods,
according to a perpetual and invariable sameness. And animal itself
indeed, having proceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad
in eternity. For eternity is _the ever in conjunction with being_.
But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad,
which Timæus on this account denominates one, as being the monad and
principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he
very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being
especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from
bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, connecting
the names; because this triad is defined according to intelligible
power. And he denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring
the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad.
The first triad therefore is the union of all the intelligibles, being
in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different
from this which is exempt from intelligibles and imparticipable. It
is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established
on account of it. But eternity is primary being, and is that which is
primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the
whole of things, we say that the first triad is that _on account of
which_ this permanency is effected; but that the second triad is that
_by which_ it is produced. For the firm establishment of beings is
indeed _according_ to this second triad, but is _on account_ of the
first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings,
and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There are also
at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity; bound indeed,
so far as it measures intelligibles; but infinity, so far as it is
the cause of perpetuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle,
eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power,
and unsluggish energy. Nevertheless, eternity is more characterised
by infinity [than by bound.] For it comprehends in itself infinite
time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For
according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now
it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eternity establishes bound
and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according
to the one indeed, it is bound; but according to power infinite; which
time[191] also demonstrates as from images; because the middle triad
[of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. For
whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal bound? For the