The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as the bound of
eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of _the one_. Whence
likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from
the power of the infinite? For the latter is a stable infinity, but
the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still
according to _the one_, so the former is moved according to number.
Since whence is the alliance of time with lives, except from the first
principle [of life, eternity?]. But time proceeds through all temporal
life.
Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity
subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here
there is infinite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual,
psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is
the father and supplier of infinite life; since eternity is also the
cause of all immortality and perpetuity. And Plotinus, exhibiting, in
a most divinely inspired manner, the peculiarity[192] of eternity,
according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life,
at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being.
For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the
one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior
to itself, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds
indeed the uniform transcendency of the first triad, but defines
the termination of the Gods, and extends from the middle on all
sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad
is filled indeed with intelligible life,[193] and on this account
is an intelligible animal, and the first animal. For it primarily
participates of the whole nature of this life; but unfolds into light
in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect
extending itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the
intelligible universe, and the apparent world the sensible universe.
Hence also, Plato denominates animal itself all-perfect. Or rather,
if you are willing we will speak thus: that in this third triad,
there are bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, which we have
called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad is denominated
only-begotten from the father which is in it. For the cause of bound
imparts that which is uncoordinated with other things, and an exempt
transcendency. For that which comprehends, says Timæus, all such
animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with any other;
since again, it would be requisite that there should be another
animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelligible
animals is a whole. But every where whole is referred[194] to bound,
and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is
only-begotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound.
But again, it is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For
this power especially pertains to that which is eternal.