The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed,
consists at first of two parts; but the all possesses a multitude of
parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as
being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not _the
one itself_, but is passive to _the one_. For _the one itself_ is
impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from
all parts. Hence the all is not the same with _the one_. We therefore,
have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says:
“Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have
the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and
whole may be one.” At the same time however, they are divided after
the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the
Elean guest separates _the one_ from the participants of _the one_,
and doubts against those who assert all things to be one, viz. the
one being, whole and the all; of which the all indeed participates of
whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts; but
whole participates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides
testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not
necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the
three intelligible[198] triads? For it was requisite, since Parmenides
defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence
derive his demonstrations of the distinction between _the one_ prior
to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles. For the
doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that the one which is
participated derives its subsistence from the imparticipable union.
_The one_[199] therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and
whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the
extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect
perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that
extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the
intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior
to the all; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all.
For the all is divided multitude; but that which contains multitude in
itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially
pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible
multitude, just as whole is the coherence and union of the all. But
the one being is in the first triad. For _the one_ is especially the
peculiarity of this triad, as Timæus also has demonstrated. And being
which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of
essence to all other things, primarily shines forth there. Again
therefore, following the Elean guest, three triads present themselves
to our view; the first indeed according to the one being; the second
according to whole; and the third according to the all. To which also