But that whole also is not the same with _the one_, Plato afterwards demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: “What then? Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmenides says, “that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”--if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of _the one_ in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be _the one_? Why? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with _the one_.” Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be _the one_. For _the one_ is impartible; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not _the one itself_. For that transcends all things and wholeness; but whole is passive to _the one_. Hence also it is denominated whole; for it is not _the one itself_. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.