The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides.
But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before
demonstrated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to
divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one
being; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and
progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union
of intelligibles as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is
not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and
the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude
with _the one_, and _the one_ with multitude. For the first God is
perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis
essence, and even _the one itself_, are taken away from the first
God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the
other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Parmenides
in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they
say he does; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods,
because they are conjoined with _the one_, and in simplicity and
union precede[201] all the divine genera. For how can the similar or
the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the
other particulars which are denied of _the one_, be inherent in the
intelligible Gods? They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting
that the things which are taken away are similitudes of the Gods;
but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are
similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in
opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again concerning
the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which
are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This
therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with
reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of
causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the
beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders,
the middle conclusions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions
to the last orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions are
asked, as there are progressions of the divine orders. And in the
first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning
the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak; since Plato
speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly
clearly unfolding his meaning.